UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov

APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/650,326	08/28/2003	Keith A. Hruska	STK-P01-599	6882
28120 ROPES & GRA	7590 09/29/200 XY LLP	EXAMINER		
PATENT DOC	KETING 39/41	BORGEEST, CHRISTINA M		
BOSTON, MA	ATIONAL PLACE 02110-2624		ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			1649	
			MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE
			09/29/2009	PAPER

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

## Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)		
10/650,326	HRUSKA ET AL.		
Examiner	Art Unit		
Christina Borgeest	1649		

	Cilistilla Bolgeest	1049	
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the	correspondence add	ress
THE REPLY FILED 03 September 2009 FAILS TO PLACE THIS	S APPLICATION IN CONDITION F	FOR ALLOWANCE.	
<ol> <li>The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on application, applicant must timely file one of the following application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Appe for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 C periods:</li> </ol>	replies: (1) an amendment, affidavi eal (with appeal fee) in compliance	t, or other evidence, v with 37 CFR 41.31; o	hich places the (3) a Request
a) The period for reply expiresmonths from the mailing	date of the final rejection.		
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this A no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire la	dvisory Action, or (2) the date set forth ter than SIX MONTHS from the mailing	g date of the final rejection	n.
Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (i MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(f	r).		
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date of have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extunder 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the s set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). NOTICE OF APPEAL	ension and the corresponding amount hortened statutory period for reply origi	of the fee. The appropri- nally set in the final Office	ate extension fee e action; or (2) as
2. The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in comp	liance with 37 CFR 41.37 must be	filed within two month	s of the date of
filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any exter Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed wi	nsion thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of the	
<u>AMENDMENTS</u>			
<ol> <li>The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, to</li> <li>They raise new issues that would require further cor</li> </ol>	nsideration and/or search (see NO		cause
(b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE below	**		
<ul><li>(c) ☐ They are not deemed to place the application in bett</li><li>_ appeal; and/or</li></ul>			ne issues for
(d) ☐ They present additional claims without canceling a c	corresponding number of finally reje	ected claims.	
NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).			
4. $\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \$		mpliant Amendment (	PTOL-324).
5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s):			
<ol> <li>Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be all non-allowable claim(s).</li> </ol>			_
7.  For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) [how the new or amended claims would be rejected is prov The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows: Claim(s) allowed: Claim(s) objected to:		l be entered and an e	xplanation of
Claim(s) objected to: Claim(s) rejected: <u>56,69-71,76 and 78</u> .			
Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration:  AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE			
8. ☐ The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, but	before or on the date of filing a No	otice of Anneal will not	he entered
because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).			
9. The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing a entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to or showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary	vercome <u>all</u> rejections under appea	al and/or appellant fail	s to provide a
<ol> <li>The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation <u>REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER</u></li> </ol>	n of the status of the claims after e	ntry is below or attach	ed.
11. The request for reconsideration has been considered but See Continuation Sheet.	does NOT place the application in	n condition for allowan	ce because:
12. Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s). (	PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)		
13.  Other:			
	/Bridget E Bunner/		
	Primary Examiner, Art U	Init 1647	
	- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		

Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because: Applicants argue that Examiner has dismissed Applicants' argument that based on Ritz, that the skilled worker would not expect a synergistic effect by combining BMP and ACE inhibitors. Further, Applicants argue the fact that Applicants are claiming a composition and not a method is irrelevant because the prior art does not teach that combining BMP morphogens and ACE inhibitors results in a synergistic reduction of proteinuria levels in a patient with diabetic neuropathy. They cite In re Soni stating that "[e]vidence of unexpected results includes evidence of synergism."

First, looking at In re Soni, the fact patterns are different between that case and the instant one. The Soni claims are product by process claims that result in a physical/structural difference that imparts greater tensile strength etc., whereas the instant claims are drawn to compositions already known in the art that when administered together improve proteinuria in a synergistic fashion. Applicants have provided no citation from In re Soni nor do they explain how this decision supports Applicants' arguments. Second, the Soni claims recite a specific molecular weight of the polymer in the claims, whereas the instant claims, which are still broad, and not drawn to any particular BMP or ACE inhibitor and do not recite any concentration/amount of the proteins. For instance, the specification teaches a dose of 10micrograms/kg of BMPs, however, this is in the same range as is taught by Sampath et al. Further, the dose of ACE inhibitors disclosed in the instant specification is the general dose administered for this drug. If Applicants' claims recite evidence of an unexpected dose or concentration that resulted in the surprising results, that would distinguish over the prior art. Note, however, the independent claims are drawn to any BMP and any ACE inhibitor, so the evidence of synergism presented by Applicants is not commensurate in scope with the claims.

Third, the only remarks made in In re Soni with regard to synergism were found by the Examiner in the dissenting opinion text:

"One way for an applicant to satisfy the burden of coming forward with evidence to rebut the prima facie case of obviousness is to demonstrate that the claimed invention yields unexpected results. In re Davies, 475 F.2d 667, 670, 177 USPQ 381, 384 (CCPA 1973). As In re Lindner makes clear, the applicant's rebuttal evidence of unexpectedness must be objective:

The affidavit and specification do contain allegations that synergistic results are obtained with all the claimed compositions, but . . . mere lawyers' arguments unsupported by factual evidence are insufficient to establish unexpected results. Likewise, mere conclusory statements in the specification and affidavits are entitled to little weight when the Patent Office questions the efficacy of those statements. . . . [W]e agree with the board that there is insufficient evidence to overcome the case of prima facie obviousness found to exist here.

Note that these remarks do not support Applicants' position, but rather the dissenting opinion states that mere allegations of synergistic results obtained with the claimed compositions are not sufficient to support a claim of non-obviousness. As set forth in the previous Office Actions, in view of the teachings of the prior art, it appears obvious that one of ordinary skill in the art would combine the BMPs and ACE inhibitors.